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Public-Private Partnerships:  
Risk Allocation and Value for Money  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasing in number worldwide and are used to build and 
manage large public infrastructure projects. PPPs enable countries, especially those with significant 
fiscal constraints, to initiate public asset construction while decreasing the fiscal burden during the 
investment phase (although this burden may increase at a later stage). PPPs incorporate private 
sector expertise and superior management to public sector projects with the aim of achieving higher 
levels of efficiency. However, concern exists with respect to the efficient use of public money in PPPs. 
There is debate surrounding the efficiency of PPPs in the realm of public procurement and, 
specifically, the value for money (VfM) effect of PPPs in the public sector. 
VfM is defined in the literature as private sector services provided at a lower cost than the same 
quality and quantity of services provided by the public sector. The lower costs offered by private 
companies are achieved from greater efficiency (at least when compared to public organisations). 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, private sector finance costs were higher than the risk-free rate that 
the public sector traditionally applied. PPPs will only create VfM if there is private sector efficiency 
that sufficiently compensates for the price difference between the project´s weighted-average cost 
of capital (WACC) and the risk-free rate (Rf). The efficiency advantage from the private sector affects 
the construction and operational phases of projects because superior management leads to lower 
costs, fewer delays, and reduced budget overruns. The efficiency advantage stems from the 
allocation and management of risk. Transferred risk is better managed by the private sector; 
therefore, costs are lower than they would be if managed by a public entity. Hence, the allocation of 
risk and appropriate risk valuation models are critical issues for PPPs. 
This paper will address four questions. (i) How is risk allocated in PPPs? (ii) How is risk valued? (iii) Do 
PPPs create VfM? (iv) Is risk allocation essential to create VfM? With respect to the first question, 
risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage them and to achieve an optimal risk 
allocation. Determining how to achieve an optimal risk allocation is complex to verify; however, only 
an optimal risk allocation reduces costs and effectively manages incentives so that a PPP will 
generate VfM. In relation to the second question concerning risk valuation, our survey shows that 
studies and analyses are recent and limited in number. Although academics (unlike governments) use 
advanced research techniques (mainly value-at-risk (VaR), cash-flow-at-risk (CFaR), and real option 
analysis), research studies are few and limited in scope. Therefore, further analyses are required, and 
more detailed techniques must be considered. Our survey also shows that governments use basic 
tools to value risks. With the exception of South Korea (which uses a Black-Scholes model), most 
countries rely on value sensitivity analysis based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or the 
equity risk premium. Despite frequent use of Monte-Carlo simulations, we believe that a government 
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qualitative approach ought to be complemented with more quantitative analyses. The risk 
assessment from the government perspective remains limited and may be a result of inexperience in 
the public sector, a lack of knowledge, or insufficient data.  
We conclude, despite the limited literature, that both academics and practitioners unanimously 
agree that risk is fundamental for VfM; however, their agreement ends here. Most academic studies 
show that PPPs projects do not generate VfM. We demonstrate that academic papers focus on five 
main points of criticism, all of which are related to risk. Contrastingly, the majority of government 
reports conclude that PPPs create VfM, although some of these reports have obvious pitfalls. We 
provide evidence that government reports are biased in favour of PPPs and present possible 
explanations. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the PPP concepts, VfM, and 
private sector efficiency. Section 3 reviews the academic literature and government guidelines on the 
allocation and valuation of risks. Additionally, this section provides insights on the risk-related 
behaviour of the different PPP parties and how the individual parties manage controversial risk. This 
section addresses the first and second research questions (i.e. how risk is allocated and valuated). 
Section 4 reviews relevant papers, case studies, and government reports concerning VfM and risks 
and addresses the last two research questions: Do PPPs create VfM, and is risk allocation crucial in 
this context? Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
  
2. THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
2.1 What are PPPs? 
A PPP has been defined as ‘an agreement where the public sector enters into long-term contractual 
agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of public sector 
infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of services (using infrastructure 
facilities) by the private sector entity to the community on behalf of a public sector entity’ (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2002, p.[pg. 248]). 
However, there are many definitions of a PPP in the literature.1 The ambiguity exists because PPPs 
are a recent phenomenon (the first PPPs appeared in the UK in the early 1990s) and governments 
worldwide have taken different approaches to PPPs. Using the dimensions of control, funding, and 
ownership, Zarco-Jasso (2005) identify eight types of PPPs. PPPs are substantially different from full 
privatisation and, according to Vega (1997), the difference lies in the transfer of risk. In a 
privatisation, all risks are transferred to the private sector, whereas some risk from a PPP is retained 
by the public sector. Moreover, contractual arrangements are the core of PPPs (Demirag & Khadaroo, 
2008) and extend over finite (but long) periods.  
PPPs are mechanisms that blend traditional procurement and full privatisation (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005a). Boardman (2010) notes that PPPs combine government control and ownership with access 
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to private sector efficiency and capital. In a PPP, the private sector is responsible for constructing, 
partial financing, asset operations, and the service provision. Despite intensive use, it remains 
unclear whether PPPs lead to more efficient use of public resources; however, the ‘infrastructure 
gap’ implies that the long-term global prospects for PPPs remain strong. Understanding government 
motivation in the use of PPPs and their ability to enhance public sector efficiency is valuable for 
future PPP success. 
 
2.2 Why do governments use PPPs? 
Governments have increasingly employed PPPs in the last few decades to finance and manage 
complex operations. The additional private sector involvement has caused a reduction in public 
sector investment in new and old infrastructure development. Governments expect that private 
sector management enables a better allocation and a more efficient use of public resources. 
However, despite the intensive use of PPPs, their effectiveness is not unequivocal. Debande (2002) 
states that PPPs use private capital to build infrastructure, which may not otherwise be possible 
without private funds because of significant government budget constraints. Another advantage to 
PPPs is that public authorities can focus on strategic priorities and rely on the private sector to 
manage operations. This provides comparative advantage in terms of efficiency (provided the private 
sector has incentive). The main benefit of PPPs is private sector efficiency (from higher quality 
management) and a reduction in construction and operational cost deviations.  
However, PPPs are often criticised as an ‘off-budget temptation’ for governments (especially when 
fiscal constraints are binding). PPPs can enable governments to make public investments and 
postpone the expenditures without compromising current budget and debt. However, PPPs can 
dilute political control over decision-making in the public sector. Bovaird (2004) argues that PPPs can 
undermine competition. Still, whether that issue is related to the structure of PPPs or the fact that 
the sectors in which PPPs are set up are low-competition is unclear. Other criticisms on PPPs have 
been raised: (i) the real levels of enhanced efficiency (Glaister, 1999); (ii) the level of accountability of 
PPPs (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003; Froud, 2003; Asenova & Beck, 2010); (iii) the efficient government 
management of the (unavoidable) problem of incomplete contracting (Blanc-Brude, 2006) and, (iv) 
the level of VfM generation for the public sector (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, 2005b).  
This study addresses concerns with two fundamental questions: (i) Should the PPP be on or off the 
public sector balance sheet? (ii) Do PPPs yield VfM?  
 
2.3 Should the PPP be on or off the public sector balance sheet? 
Infrastructure development typically has two stages: construction and operation. The majority of 
infrastructure requires high levels of investments but low levels of annual operating and 
maintenance costs. Using highways in Portugal during the last 15 years, as an example, Sarmento 
(2010) finds that construction costs amounted to between €3,000,000 and €7,000,000 per km, 
whereas annual operating and maintenance costs were approximately €75,000 per km. This shows 
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that the majority of the PPP financial outlay occurs in the first four or five years, during the 
construction stage. Therefore, accounting for this phase in the public budget is a key issue. 
In traditional procurement, the investment is a public expenditure because it is recognised at the 
moment of payment, which affects the deficit and the national debt. In contrast, the majority of 
Eurozone countries consider the PPP as an off-balance sheet operation. Investments are considered 
as private because long-term construction and availability, or demand risk, are transferred to the 
private sector. Investments are not considered in the deficit and the debt during the construction 
years, placing the government in a better fiscal position. Future payments from the government to 
the private sector are recognised as expenditures, increasing the deficit in the payment years. This 
tendency has led many academics to criticise a PPP as an off-balance sheet temptation. 
The temptation to deliver a public service through a PPP is a reflection of budget rather than efficient 
public procurement. The high levels of public expenditure for assets and services indicates that 
governments are concerned with public deficits to a greater extent than VfM. Hence, we conclude 
that governments use PPPs for a single purpose: to place certain public investment outside the public 
accounts. Figure 1 shows the tendency for countries with higher levels of public debt to use PPPs to a 
greater extent. This temptation is facilitated by the accounting mechanism that allows governments 
to build public projects and to simultaneously maintain public expenditure levels, taxes, and deficits 
by postponing PPP costs. However, problems regarding affordability may arise when the postponed 
payments emerge in the subsequent decades, as is the case with Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
2.4 Are PPPs value for money? 
VfM provides the same quantity and quality of services at a lower overall cost (i.e. the whole-life cost 
required to meet the user´s requirements) (Ball, 2007). Fitzgerald (2004) argues that VfM can be 
delivered through risk transfer, innovation, greater asset utilisation, and integrated whole-life 
management. Andersen (2000) mentions risk as only one of the six drivers of VfM; however, this 
paper demonstrates that risk is the most crucial of the six.  
The private sector must be more efficient than the public sector because the public sector’s 
borrowing costs are lower. Since 2007, the sequence of property, bank, and government debt crises 
has brought some concern with respect to this rule for a number of countries. As long as public 
sector interest rates are lower than those of the private sector, PPPs will generate VfM if private 
sector efficiency is greater than the difference in financial costs. After all, if:  
Rf < Rd < Re, then Rf < WACC 
then PPPs can generate VfM if: 
Efficiency gains > (WACC – Rf). 
where Rf, Rd, Re, and WACC stand for the risk-free rate, the cost of debt, the cost of equity, and the 
weighted-average cost of capital, respectively. 
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Debande (2002) and Quiggin (2005) add that the benefits of PPPs should compensate for the 
additional costs of recurring to private sector financing. The private sector has a higher discount 
factor for two reasons. First, the public sector faces lower risk because it does not default in the 
same way as private companies. Second, risks to the public sector are borne by the taxpayer. The risk 
premium is the market evaluation of the risk transfer to the private sector, and the higher financial 
cost forces the private sector to be more efficient.  
The private sector is considered more efficient than the public sector because the former is subject 
to superior incentives towards cost-effective investments, to control operational costs and especially 
manage risks better. How to allocate risk and the choice of risk model assessment for PPPs are 
critical issues in private sector performance. Grout (1997) demonstrates that inappropriate risk 
allocation, in conjunction with a lack of competition, innovation, and transparency usually leads to 
PPP failure. Risk transfer improves the cost efficiency of PPPs and renders them more cost efficient 
than traditional procurement. An effective transfer of risk from the public to the private sector can 
lead to a more explicit treatment of risk because it is the acceptance of risk that provides motivation 
to the private sector to price and produce efficiently.  
According to Sarmento (2010), the public sector comparator (PSC) prior to the bid is an effective 
measure for evaluating VfM because it enables the public sector to base decisions on a financial 
evaluation of alternatives. The PSC is the difference between the costs for the public sector of a PPP 
payment and the cost of building the asset or providing it through traditional procurement. The PSC 
is based on full cost, revenue, and risk estimates in cash flow terms, discounted at the public sector 
rate to determine the net present value (NPV), and compared with the discounted value of payments 
to the private supplier (considering the risks and costs retained by the public sector) (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005b). The PSC is, therefore, the cost difference between the two procurement options for 
the same project. Grimsey & Lewis (2005b) argue that the PSC is simpler and easier to compute than 
any of its alternatives. The PSC offers a cost-effective trade-off between a full cost-benefit analysis of 
all project options (conducted in Germany) and the selection of the best private bid (the method 
used in France). The PSC ensures that all options are subject to the same analyses and tests. The PSC 
should be calculated prior to evaluating bids for two reasons. First, the PSC will be evaluated as a 
‘pure’ public sector option and, second, it enables the public decision maker to understand the VfM 
elements that the private bid should reflect. Therefore, it is important to maintain a current PSC. The 
PSC becomes a negotiating tool for the public sector, enabling it to achieve the best possible deal. 
The PSC should provide the base for costing. It represents a fair estimation of all costs, for the same 
level of volume and quality that the public sector would provide.  
Once the NPVs of both the PSC and the PPP are adjusted to reflect comparable bases, they can then 
be compared. Ceteris paribus (i.e. with respect to quality and risk allocation), VfM is generated when 
the total present value of the cost of private sector supply is less than the NPV of the base cost of the 




However, the PSC is liable to potential pitfalls in the forecasting cash flows and choice of an 
appropriate discount rate (Froud, 2003; Shaoul, 2005). Grimsey and Lewis (2005b) add that the risk 
analysis required for the PSC is part of a broader process of risk identification, allocation, and 
management. In many cases, the difference between the PSC and the private sector proposal will be 
relatively narrow and the procurer has to make professional judgments as to the VfM to be derived 
from contracting with the private sector and the risks which that route involves.  
3. PPPs AND RISK 
 
This section presents an overview of the academic literature and government guidelines concerning 
risk allocation that is central to achieving VfM from PPPs.  
Risk management with respect to PPPs is a potential factor contributing to efficiency (Glaister, 
Scanlon, & Travers, 2000). It consists of a structured approach to the identification, assessment, and 
control of risks that emerge during the policy, program, or project lifecycle (HM Treasury, 2003a). 
The identification of the source of risk is required to effectively manage risk.2 Additionally, the 
responsible party for risk at each project stage and the management strategy for minimising the 
potential negative consequences of the risk during the entire project life must be determined 
(McDowall, 2003). Investment projects are vulnerable to behavioural biases: managers are 
concerned with the size of potential losses to a greater extent than the likelihood of a loss occurring 
(Helliar, 2001).  
In this section, we analyse how the three main parties in a PPP (the government, the private 
companies, and banks as lenders) address risk.  
 
3.1 Risk and the PPP actors 
The three main parties involved in a PPP are the public sector (the public entity that grants the 
service), a private company, and the private bank sector. Each partner holds a different perspective 
with respect to time, risk, and decision making (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010), especially 
concerning the identification, analysis, quantification, and allocation of risk. The different motives, 
goals, and values of the involved parties require successful cooperation and interaction and a high 
level of trust between the players.  
  
3.1.1 The public sector perspective with respect to risk 
There have been several developments in the PPP concept of risk. First, several innovations have 
been introduced in the field of risk identification, allocation, valuation, and management (Shaoul, 
2005). Second, the public sector has a fixed payment schedule, which reduces financial risk. This fixed 
payment does not guarantee that there will be available resources in the public budget for these 
costs. However, a fixed payment schedule is an advantage because the guaranteed and stable prices 
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(even if higher) cater to public sector risk aversion. Third, the law of large numbers applies to the 
public sector with respect to risk as a probability. This advantage is also at the centre of the public 
sector´s optimism bias, often presented as a criticism. The optimism bias implies that the public 
sector accepts a lower probability of a negative event compared to other sectors. It can also be 
considered as systematic bias by appraisers in the over-estimation of a key project’s parameters. 
There are several reasons for this bias. Optimism is common in the public sector because the sector 
often suffers from poor management and inadequate information. However, the main reason for the 
bias is that losses are borne by the taxpayer, whereas they are borne by the shareholder in the 
private sector.  
The use of PPPs also entails certain disadvantages (for the public sector). PPPs reduce the public 
sector’s power in addressing changing needs and circumstances (Quiggin, 2005) because there is 
limited opportunity for the renegotiation of contracts (following the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda). Additionally, even in cases where a renegotiation of a contract is possible, the private 
sector has a significant advantage from information asymmetry. Another criticism in literature is the 
paradox of infrastructure investments (Gleason, 1995). The paradox stems from the high risk 
associated with high returns because, as noted by Esty (2004), the sponsor may appear to profit 
excessively at taxpayer expense. Excessive private sector profits can generate an aversion to 
investment trough PPPs. 
There is a perception that the public sector carries a lower level of risk than the private sector with 
respect to investment and financing choices (Sarmento, 2010). Public sector investments have not, 
historically, distinguished between investment and financing decisions: investments are frequently 
undertaken when credit is cheap and abundant, although the investment decision should consider 
opportunity cost (i.e. whether there is no better alternative use for taxpayer money). Consequently, 
the minimum hurdle rate that the public sector employs is often lower than that of the private 
sector, a situation exacerbated by public sector consideration of variables such as public interest, 
economic externalities, and social assistance in addition to maximum value. Brealey, Cooper, and 
Habib (1997) question whether governments view public sector projects as low risk, or whether 
governments consider that projects are low risk because they are undertaken by the public sector. 
The authors show that the evaluation of the investment should be independent of the financing 
source. The fact that the public sector usually has a lower interest rate should be irrelevant in the 
evaluation of a project. Too often, countries approve projects because there are available resources 
and not because of their economic or social value. Because PPPs have no impact on the public deficit 
during the investment phase, they have become an off-budget temptation. Hence, not separating the 
investment and financing decisions has led to a myopic perspective by the public sector with respect 
to investment and a misjudgement of risk.  
Successful public sector risk management requires a proactive rather than a reactive approach. PPPs 
force the public sector to examine risk in alternative ways than traditional public procurement. 
Private sector experience with risk and greater incentive to deal with risk implies a private sector 
advantage when negotiating with the public sector. The next subsection explains why the private 




3.1.2 The private sector’s perspective on risk 
The private sector has traditionally been better prepared to deal with risk for two reasons: (i) the 
private sector exhibits no optimism bias concerning risk. Such bias would increase bankruptcy risk 
and, (ii) private sector project financing is conducted with substantial experience in risk estimation 
and management. Two private sector players are involved in PPPs: the company (and sponsors) and 
the lender. How they behave towards risk, with each other and the public sector, is analysed in this 
subsection. 
Sponsors of PPPs are investors who are responsible for the project and the equity capital. Because a 
PPP is developed under project finance rules, sponsors only receive the return on their investment in 
the final stage. Project finance has a cascading cash flow, whereas revenue distribution follows a 
specific order: operating and maintenance costs, taxes, debt services, and equity returns. Therefore, 
sponsors assume the highest financial risk and require a higher return on equity than the cost of 
debt. However, if the project defaults, they lose the capital they invested. From the sponsor’s 
perspective, the low level of equity does not imply a higher propensity for risk. 
From a private capital perspective, the high scale of investment, delayed payback period and 
maturity, and the various risks involved can make a project extremely risky. Usually, lenders show 
greater concern for risk than sponsors because PPPs rely on debt to a greater extent than equity. Esty 
(2004) shows that debt on PPPs represents 70 to 90% of the investment, which is three times more 
than traditional corporate financing companies. Because banks assume the majority of the financing, 
their risk aversion increases and they are eager for the project to assume as low a level of risk as 
possible. 
Banks are involved in the early phases of projects. They gauge projects to ensure acceptable risk 
levels and sufficient project cash flows for the debt service (Asenova & Beck, 2010). Lenders are 
concerned with the level of risk transfer to the PPP and the reallocation of risk to third parties. 
Lenders would prefer that the PPP resemble an ‘empty box’ in terms of risk (Yescombe, 2011) and 
have become reluctant to accept any but the most limited and measurable risk. If a project is low 
risk, it enables the bank to lend greater amounts at a low interest rate. Therefore, the difference 
between the WACC and Rf may not be that high. Consequently, the private sector’s efficiency should 
be sufficient to overcome the difference and generate VfM. Lenders bear the financial and 
bankruptcy risks and, if project revenues fall below estimates (or in the extreme event that the 
project defaults), lenders are not repaid. However, the low likelihood of such an event enables banks 
to support projects under suitable conditions.  
 
3.1.3 Summary of risks and PPP parties 
The three main parties in PPPs possess different goals: the public sector, the private companies, and 
the lending banks. The public sector is concerned with VfM and efficient public spending, whereas 
the private sector (i.e. the private companies and the lenders) is profit-oriented. Different players 
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with different objectives have a different perspective on risk. The public sector has a different 
approach to PPP risk than traditional public procurement. Additionally, the public sector has an 
‘optimism bias’, making it less efficient in the management of most of risks. PPPs bring innovation in 
the management of risks by separating investment and financing decisions and that public sector 
only have lower interest rates because the taxpayer´s support losses.  
The banks minimise bankruptcy risk and participate in the risk allocation process. Low operational 
risk reduces the financial costs, which increases the potential to create VfM. However, as the 
investment and financial decision, in many cases, is not separate, suitable financial conditions often 
encourage governments to invest in suboptimal projects.  
This follows from the fact that the private sector has higher standards concerning investment 
conditions because the private sector experiences higher default risks and potential losses. Lower 
project risk can be achieved in two ways: either the company transfers the risks to third parties or 
the government guarantees a portion of the risk. Therefore, projects can possess high leverage 
without assuming a high level of risk. 
 
3.2 Risk Allocation 
The higher financial costs of the private sector must be compensated for by greater efficiency in 
operations and risk management to obtain sufficiently high VfM. The optimal risk allocation reduces 
the economic cost, provides incentive for sound management, and reduces the need for future 
renegotiation (Asenova & Beck, 2010). A UK survey, (Li, 2005) finds that risk allocation is the first 
priority for the private sector, whereas it is a secondary priority for the public sector following the 
overcoming of budgetary constraints. 
 
3.2.1 Risk allocation in the PPP literature 
The academic literature considers three risk allocation factors: 1) risk classification, 2) the general 
allocation of risk, and 3) the allocation of specific risk.  
Risk can be categorised in several ways: (i)  endogenous versus exogenous risk (exogenous risk 
cannot be controlled); (ii)  commercial risk (allocated preferably to the private sector) versus legal 
and political risk (usually allocated to the public sector) (OECD, 2008); (iii) development phase risk 
(planning and construction), the operation and transfer phase risk, and the lifetime phase (political, 
financial, environmental, and force majeure risks) (Jin, 2010) and, (iv) risks at the macro-, meso- and 
micro-level (Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005a). Macro-level risks are exogenous and are 
composed of country/industry risk in addition to acts of God. Meso-level risk includes endogenous 
risk but occurs within project system boundaries such as those concerned with construction, 
demand, and technology. Micro-level risks are assumed by stakeholders and are party-related (rather 
than project-related).  
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Risk allocation complexity arises because the contractual arrangement is achieved through a 
bargaining process (Medda, 2007). The literature examines whether the risk allocation advantages 
lead to biased conclusions concerning PPP adoption at the expense of traditional procurement. The 
criticism is that PPP efficiency is predominantly a result of the pricing of risk in the PSC and from the 
perceived cost overruns that occur under conventional public investment (Sawyer, 2005). This is 
discussed in the following subsections.  
The majority of PPP risk can be allocated simply: risks can be retained by the public sector, 
transferred to the private company that manages the PPP (which could opt in turn to reallocate risk 
to third parties), or shared between public and private parties.  
Certain risk is always borne by the public sector (e.g. political risk such as unilateral change in 
contracts or changes in sector legislation, regulation related to archaeological finds and fossil 
discoveries, and acts of God). These risks almost always remain with the public sector because they 
cannot be controlled and could lead to project default. If the private sector were to take 
responsibility for such risks, it would expect a high financial premium, which would undermine the 
VfM concept. Other types of risk (related to construction, operations, and maintenance) are always 
transferred to the private company. This transfer has a minimal level of risk because below this level 
there is little incentive for private sector efficiency and, therefore, for VfM generation. The allocation 
of other types of risk such as planning, environmental, demand, and interest rate risk are allocated to 
other parties and are summarised in Table 1 .  
Demand risk should be allocated to the private sector for several reasons. Demand risk management 
requires additional effort and efficiency from the private sector (Chung, Hensher, & Rose, 2010). The 
private sector understands how to attract users and how to calculate demand elasticity. The private 
sector is better equipped to accomplish commercial tasks. 
Because finance risks are economic risks associated with project finance, some researchers believe 
they should be allocated to the private sector. Interest rate and financial market risk representing 
project finance economic risk should also be allocated to the private sector. PPPs are essentially a 
project finance scheme with non-resource debt. This implies that the banks will lend money based 
solely on the project’s future cash flows. Allocating financial risk to the private sector prompts the 
PPP to pursue sound risk management. Because financing is the greatest cost, the private sector is 
motivated to minimise it. Finally, the private sector is more familiar and experienced with financial 
markets than the public sector (Bing et al., 2005a). However, some authors (e.g. Wang, 2000) 
consider that traditional public sector borrowing rates are lower than private sector borrowing rates 
and that this risk should be shared by government guaranteed private sector financing.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
3.2.2 Risk allocation in governments reports 
Governments view PPP risk allocation as critical for VfM. Some public authorities have created PPP 
manuals, and Table 2 summarises their perspectives on risk. These manuals provide guidelines and 
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procedures for government departments involved in PPPs and identify the steps necessary to achieve 
VfM. The guidelines intend to ensure that the PPP process is homogeneous across government 
departments to enhance transparency and objectivity in PPP management.  
The government reports presented in Table 2 identify the risks that should be retained by the public 
sector, the risks that should be transferred to the private company, and the risks that are subject to 
negotiation between the private and public sector. The manuals also consider the PSC as a risk 
adjustment cost. The risks are assessed individually, subjected to sensitivity analyses, and aggregated 
in NPV terms. Some manuals also contain risk contingency plans and guidelines in case the public 
sector is forced to reassume risk.  
Government efforts to address risk allocation are undermined by the off-balance sheet temptation. 
Therefore, many PPPs incorrectly allocate risk because the projects must be incorporated into PPPs 
to avoid fiscal constraints and not because of the process itself. The need to invest through PPPs to 
avoid budget constraints leads to incorrect risk allocation, which undermines VfM.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
3.2.3 Summary of PPP risk allocation 
The PPP literature focuses mainly on the risk allocation process. Accurate insight into the various 
types of risk is central to VfM. The risk allocation process may be misused to exploit PPP advantages 
over traditional procurement. Without accounting for risk transfer, traditional procurement may 
appear cheaper than PPPs. The governments that adopt PPPs have developed guidelines for the 
retention, transfer, and negotiation of risk. Additionally, governments provide risk allocation and 
valuation guidelines. The next subsection addresses the valuation of risk.  
 
3.3 PPP risk valuation models 
PPP risk is similar to traditional project risk. The typical project finance evaluation methods are 
employed to value PPPs, although each type of risk should be individually evaluated before 
aggregation with other types of risk. Additionally, each type of risk should undergo a sensitivity 
analysis to determine the robustness of the forecasts and the business plan.  
The combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods (often in combination with a Monte-
Carlo analysis) has been proposed for risk valuation (Tanaka, 2005).3 However, a Monte-Carlo 
simulation is only appropriate if there is sufficient, quality data, otherwise simple probability 
methods are sufficient (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005b).  
No consensus exists in the literature concerning the optimal discount rate to calculate present value 
(Sarmento, 2010). Two conflicting theories are apparent: (i) public projects bear minimal risk and 
require the risk-free discount rate (or a governmental borrowing rate) and, (ii) public projects require 
a private sector discount rate (Arrow & Lind, 1970) and (Mehra & Prescott, 1988). Brealey et al. 
(1997) argue that the discount rate for government projects equals the expected return in the capital 
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markets for comparable investments, that is, the opportunity cost of capital for the private sector. 
The discount rate can have an overwhelming influence on the NPV. Sarmento (2010) studies seven 
highway projects and shows that the sum of the NPV of these PPPs drops by more than one billion 
Euro (from eight billion to under seven billion) if the discount rate augments from 4.5% to 6%.  
Academics apply a wide variety of more sophisticated techniques (Table 3) in contrast to the 
governments who usually stick to simple valuation methods such as discounted cash-flows (see Table 
4).  
VaR has gained in popularity as it measures the risk of losses in a specific portfolio of financial assets. 
VaR is defined as the maximum potential loss (given by a certain confidence level, eg: 95% or 99%) 
which faced by a portfolio or financial institution within a certain period. For example, a VaR of a 
trading portfolio of 50 million in a specific currency at a 99% confidence level implies that there is 
only one chance in 100, under normal market conditions, that a loss greater than 50 million will 
occur. This number summarises the portfolio’s exposure to market risk, the probability of loss and 
the level of risk in that specific currency. It also provides an aggregated portfolio risk that accounts 
for leverage, correlation, and current position. The method can be broadly applied, from market to 
other types of financial risk (Jorion, 2006). The method is used for risk management, financial 
control, and reporting. 
Some researchers question whether common credit risk evaluation models are suitable for PPPs 
because of specific project finance characteristics (Esty, 2004). Gatti, Rigamonti, Saita, and Senati et 
al. (2007) argue that applying VaR to project finance in the same way as traditional corporate 
financing is not possible. VaR is mainly used for financial portfolios, and PPPs are usually conducted 
in a non-financial industry context. An alternative is the Cash-Flow at risk (CFaR) approach that 
assumes uncertain future cash flows and thus a more realistic approach. However, instead of using a 
single NPV, this approach yields a range of expected values. CFaR represents the cash that would be 
received or paid from a portfolio of transactions with a likelihood of certainty within a specific time 
horizon. Earnings-at-risk (EaR) is another approach similar to the CFaR that uses a cash base to 
estimate earnings and expenditures instead of cash flows and adopts an accrual perspective. 
(Insert Table 3 and 4 here) 
 
Ye (2000) and Sudong and Tiong (2000) developed a new method called NPV-at-risk, which combines 
the cost of capital, measured by WACC, and dual risk return methods. This method allows the 
correlation and measuring of risk and return. NPV-at-risk represents the minimum expected NPV at a 
specific confidence level (e.g. 95%). It involves the determination of the discount rate and the 
generation of the cumulative distribution of possible NPVs. The authors argue that NPV-at-risk can 
lead to superior decisions concerning the risk evaluation of infrastructure projects. Other authors 
(Cheah & Jicai, 2006; Alonso-Conde, Brown, & Rojo-Suarez, 2007; and Takashima, Yagi, & Takamori, 
2010) introduced the concept of real options in evaluating PPP risk. Real options consist of a 
proactive approach in managing uncertainty. 
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Whereas the proposed valuation methods are presented in the academic research, Table 4 shows the 
valuation methods of governments for PPPs. Governments prefer a qualitative approach based on 
nominal or descriptive scales that describe the likelihood and consequences of specific types of risk. 
Traditionally, the public sector has often used a risk probability assessment (to determine the 
likelihood of a risk occurring) and a risk impact assessment (to determine the potential effect of a risk 
event) in a straightforward way, possibly because of the public sector’s inexperience, lack of 
knowledge, insufficient data, and complexities in defining risk in terms of likelihood and impact. 
Broadbent, Gill, & Laughlin (2008) report a recent trend towards more quantitative risk evaluation. 
The Australian government uses the CAPM with a discounted cash flow (DCF). The CAPM is a 
frequently used risk-return model and was independently introduced by Treynor (1961), Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) and builds on the earlier work of Markowitz concerning the diversification 
and modern portfolio theory further developed by Black (1972). The CAPM is based on restrictive 
assumptions concerning transaction costs and asymmetric information. Ross (1976)4 suggests a 
different model, the arbitrage pricing model (APM) that offers no arbitrage opportunity. The market 
risk of any asset is provided by the betas of the factors that affect all investments. The Australian 
government also applies a risk model using Monte-Carlo simulation.  
The UK government sets a risk premium using Monte-Carlo simulation. (HM Treasury, 2003a). The 
fact that the UK government uses a more complex analysis is not necessarily a reflection of more 
sophisticated or less controversial risk valuation methods because such methods do not appear to 
capture all of the risk values in the risk transfer.  
The South Korean public sector uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model to examine whether the 
returns to private participants are appropriate for the risks that they bear. A project is valued as an 
option and the payoff is a function of the value of an underlying asset. The minimum revenue 
guarantee is interpreted as a private participant put option on the toll revenue, and early termination 
is a put option on the project. This method enables the public sector to examine and valuate the risk 
for all parties involved in the PPP. It allows the estimation of fair returns based on the contractual 
returns of the private participants. The benchmark for the private sector premium is the five-year 
government bond yield. However, this model requires a complex analysis with additional data 
requirements and the South Korean government remains in the early stages of the Black-Scholes 
method. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF PPP, VfM, AND RISK 
 
Although PPPs have increased in recent decades, there are doubts concerning their efficiency. 
Academics and governments have performed studies to examine whether PPPs yield VfM (Hodge & 
Greve, 2009).  
This section reviews the evaluations of PPP VfM by academics and the public sector (governments 
and audit court reports) over the last 15 years. We address the last two research questions of this 
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paper: Do PPPs create VfM, and does risk play a fundamental role in VfM generation? The majority of 
the research that we surveyed concludes that PPPs do not generate sufficient VfM and, therefore, 
questions their efficiency. Contrastingly, governments and audit courts present a positive picture of 
PPP VfM.  
We searched academic journal databases from the year 2000 and gathered book chapters and 
studies that were presented at academic conferences. We retained the papers that performed an 
evaluation of VfM in PPP projects. The research focused on the UK and Australia; therefore, we 
compare these results with the government information and audit court reports from these two 
countries.  
 
4.1 Academic case studies 
Whether risk plays a fundamental role in VfM generation can be briefly addressed. This is because 
the majority of academics (as well as the government and audit court reports) are unanimous that 
risk is the central factor (perhaps the most important factor) in the generation of VfM from PPPs. 
Whether PPPs create value is considered from a negative perspective by the majority of authors (see 
Table 5). 
(Insert Table 5 and 6 here) 
Academics provide five main explanations for the lack of sufficient VfM generation by PPPs (Table 6). 
First, the private sector assumes limited risk and has thus few incentives to pursue superior 
management and efficiency. Second, risk is an ambiguous and complex concept with accompanying 
valuation uncertainty. Third, the methods used to valuate risk are incomplete. Fourth, the PSC 
favours PPPs because of optimism bias or the use of artificially low discount rates. Finally, PPPs often 
exhibit VfM only after risk transfer, which closes the gap between the PSC and PPP. 
Risk transfer is used to render PPPs an advantageous solution. Several authors conclude that without 
accounting for risk transfer, traditional procurement or the PSC is cheaper (Pollock, 2002). The 
efficiency gains from PPPs appear to rely on the pricing of risk transfer or in the expected overrun of 
costs in the public sector (Sawyer, 2005). Hood, Fraser, and McGarvey (2006) also state that many 
critics of PPPs have argued that the government has overemphasised the risk that the private sector 
truly assumes. Ball (2007) shows that when risk transfers are not considered, VfM is negative. To 
illustrate why negative VfM occurs, we use the following example. Suppose a PPP faces the PSC cost 
in NPV terms. This implies that to generate VfM, a PPP should meet the following restriction (in NPV 
terms): 
PPP payments < (PSC cost of construction + PSC operation and maintenance costs + risk transfer to 
the private sector). 
When the risk is transferred to the private sector, the NPV of the PPP payments becomes higher than 
the NPV of the PSC construction plus the operating and maintenance costs. Most academics conclude 
that the PPP is an inferior option in public procurement. 
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The debate is expected to continue, at least until the entire life-cycle of sufficient projects has been 
studied in detail (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). Many projects remain in the early stages, and VfM can only 
be properly evaluated over the long term (Nisar, 2007; Weihe, 2008; Hodge & Greve, 2009). A 
greater number of detailed academic studies are required to overcome the gap between theoretical 
knowledge and practical experience. Academics do not consider PPPs an effective and efficient 
alternative to traditional procurement, whereas governments reach the opposite conclusion. These 
varying opinions require further analysis. 
  
4.2 Public sector reports 
The public sector perspective concerning PPPs is drawn from government reports and reports from 
the Court of Audit or National Audit Offices. Governments are an actively involved party, in contrast 
to academics and audit courts. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from government reports must be 
considered with caution. Audit courts are independent. They scrutinise government action and 
decisions to sanction poor decisions by public managers or to provide recommendations for the 
appropriate use of public resources. We separate the public sector reports in Table 7 into 
government reports (Panel A) and audit court reports (Panel B). We refer to Table 7 as we attempt to 
address the last two research questions: Do PPPs generate VfM? Does risk transfer play a key role in 
VfM generation? 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
The majority of government reports conclude that PPPs generate VfM. Although most audit court 
reports reach the same conclusion, they are conservative in concluding that a PPP yields VfM. A 
cross-country report shows that the UK government appears the most enthusiastic concerning PPP 
efficiency.  
UK government studies (Table 7) cover a range of projects and sectors and compare a PPP with 
traditional procurement in terms of performance. All four UK government studies that we surveyed 
concluded that PPPs generate VFM. The conclusion was based on within deadline and budget PPP 
project delivery, unlike traditional procurement. Governments assess a PPP’s efficiency in relation to 
alternatives and do not state whether a PPP leads to a Pareto optimal solution. Two of the UK 
government studies were sector specific (public schools) and focused on the significance of risk in 
generating VfM. Three Australian government studies used the same approach as the UK studies and 
drew the same conclusion (PPPs are more efficient than traditional procurement). We also examined 
13 audit court reports from the UK and four from Australia. These reports raise concern with respect 
to the efficiency of PPPs. Some PPP projects effectively and efficiently achieve goals, whereas others 
do not. Thus, overall, the courts have a mixed perspective concerning PPP ability to generate VfM. 
The arguments for and against PPPs in public sector reports are listed in Table 8. The main reason for 
support of PPPs is their efficiency compared to traditional procurement. Efficiency is defined as the 
timely and within budget delivery of services. Moreover, PPPs deliver the contracted results 
(although traditional procurement also does so using third-party contractors). The experience curve 
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of the parties involved is another factor encouraging PPP support. Two decades since PPP first 
emerged, the processes are more efficient because the public and private sectors have gained 
experience. Finally, PPPs eliminate some risks to public sector. Contrastingly, traditional procurement 
does not eliminate risk but merely transfers the responsibility to taxpayers. The risks may be less 
visible, but they are still present. 
Arguments exist in opposition of PPPs, some originating from the public sector and especially by the 
audit courts. VfM depends almost exclusively on risk transfer, and any conclusion concerning VfM is 
subjective. Some argue that the private sector bears limited risk, whereas the public sector bears 
more risk than it should. A final argument by the audit courts is that PPP evaluation is not entirely 
independent, especially when conducted by governments.  
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
The public sector has two arguments in support of PPPs. First, because the public sector is less 
efficient, building an asset or providing a service using public administration resources is expensive. 
Second, PPPs reduce uncertainty for public managers because the cost and output are known ex-
ante (although this argument may be undermined by potential frequent renegotiations and financial 
rescues). The main criticism is that PPPs only generate VfM following risk transfer. The VfM, in the 
calculation of the PSC as opposed to the PPP payments, is the value of the risk transfer that balances 
the PSC cost in favour of the PPP. Relying on risk transfer to assure VfM is controversial. Andersen 
(2000) and the UK National Audit Office (2003) state that PPPs, after risk transfer, have exhibited 
VfM although their conclusions may be biased.5  
Academics conclude that PPPs do not generate VfM, as shown in 25 out of the 40 papers that we 
analysed. The remainder is unsure whether PPPs can generate VfM (eleven papers) or are certain 
that PPPs do yield VfM (four papers). Government researchers, however, mostly conclude that PPPs 
generate VfM, as shown in six of the seven studies we reviewed (one study was inconclusive). Audit 
court researchers are divided; 7 of 17 studies show that PPPs generate VFM, seven do not, and three 
were inconclusive. 
We find that academics and governments agree that risk transfer is central to achieving VfM with 
respect to PPPs; however, they disagree whether PPPs generate VfM. We discuss the biases from the 
public and private sector perspectives in the following subsection.  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
 
4.3 Study limitations 
Academics, governments, and audit courts agree on the critical role of risk in VfM generation; 
however, their diverging opinions concerning PPP ability to generate VfM are surprising. The 
divergence is caused by several factors. First, PPP evaluation is complex because evaluations are time 
specific and, to date, no PPP project has completed the operational phase. Even the oldest PPPs 
(initiated in the early 1990s) have not yet completed their life-cycle, and most projects have not yet 
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reached maturity. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate an entire PPP process. Second, 
government studies are based on a single PPP or country, whereas academic studies involve the 
study of a larger number of PPPs. Third, the level of experience with PPPs differs according to 
country: the UK has initiated more than 100 PPPs and Portugal, Spain, and South Korea have initiated 
more than 40 PPPs each (Araújo, 2010). Other countries are just beginning to use PPPs. Fourth, 
benchmark studies on traditional public procurement are required to evaluate PPPs, but limited 
research exists on this topic (with the exception of Flyvbjerg, 2002; Pickrell, 1990; and Fouracre, 
1990). This gap in the literature adds complexity to the measuring of public sector inefficiency and its 
comparison with the real cost of PPPs. Fifth, academic studies suffer from limited data, whereas 
government agencies have access to richer data (Hodge & Greve, 2009). Sixth, some studies mix the 
investment decision with the finance decision. There are cases where governments identify assets to 
be built using limited economic or social rationality. Seventh, academic evaluations may be more 
objective with an independent viewpoint (known as the arm´s length principle for PPPs (Boardman 
and Vining, 2011) compared to governments and even audit courts (that tend to focus on legal issues 
rather than performance). Additionally, academics use superior valuation methods than the public 
sector. Eighth, government analysis and risk management may be subject to optimism bias that can 
cause the public sector to be vulnerable to risk.  
 
4.4 A cross-country comparison: the UK and Australian experience 
The majority of PPP studies originate from the UK or Australia. Although these studies address 
different project types (e.g. schools, prisons, health care institutions), some are comparable in terms 
of scope (Panel A, Table 10). These studies differ in terms of methodology (Panel B of Table 10). 
Government studies compare traditional procurement costs with those of PPPs, or the real and 
estimated PPP costs of the base case, whereas academic researchers base their findings on case-
studies and surveys. 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
The UK studies by Macdonald (2002) and the National Audit Office (2003) that compare the PSC (or 
the real cost to the public sector) to PPP cost, conclude that VfM has been generated. Studies for 
Australia by Group (2007) and Forum (2008) find similar results. A UK study on PPPs for schools that 
was based on surveys of the project stakeholders also shows VfM.  
These government findings may be biased because they reflect individual perceptions, which may 
focus on quality and availability and not on costs and risk transfer. These studies compare the 
present solution (PPPs) with that of the past (public procurement), but do not compare PPPs with the 
most efficient theory, model, or existing solution. 
Shaoul (2005) presents a VfM methodology for the UK health sector that determines the risk transfer 
and compares the cost of the PSC with PPPs. The study concludes that PPPs are more costly than the 
PSC before risk transfer. The author shows that VfM was based solely on risk transfer (a vague and 
subjective basis). The National Audit Office (2010b) compares the real costs with the estimated, 
19 
 
original contract costs for the health sector, but this analysis does not study VfM, unless the original 
contracts themselves have shown VfM. 
Group (2007) and Forum (2008) conducted comprehensive studies in Australia on PPP projects by 
comparing the costs between PPPs and public procurement. The assessment on PPP VfM is positive, 
and the studies show that public investment is more costly with time and budget overruns. 
Contrastingly, English (2003) reviews performance audits in Australia and finds that PPPs do not 
generate VfM. The different methods used in these studies make the results difficult to compare. 
Only a few audit reports used in English’s (2003, 2007) work are available and are based on the pre-
contracting stage. The reports focus on the performance of the contract benchmark with best 
practices. The audits do not compare the alternative public sector ‘state of the art’. It should be 
noted that the conclusions of these government reports and English (2003) is not totally 
contradictory: English (2003, 2007) concludes that PPPs do not perform well, but Group (2007) and 
Forum (2008) conclude that they perform better than traditional procurement. PPPs can 
underperform and still be a better solution than traditional procurement. However, we cannot draw 
a definite conclusion for the Australian case based on our review. 
We find diverging distinctions among the conclusions in the 64 studies reviewed. Overall, academics 
are sceptical concerning PPP ability to generate VfM, whereas governments and audit courts are 
more confident concerning PPP efficiency.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Governments use PPPs for two purposes: to remove public investments from the balance-sheet and 
to generate VfM. A PPP creates VfM when it provides the same level of service quality and quantity 
at a lower overall cost than traditional public sector procurement. Because private sector financial 
costs are traditionally higher than those of the public sector, PPPs face a financial disadvantage. 
Therefore, VfM from PPPs must originate from greater efficiency provided by the private sector, an 
efficiency that must compensate for the sector´s higher financial costs. The private sector is more 
efficient because there are built-in, performance-oriented incentives and economies of scale. PPP 
efficiency is a result of investment and operational cost and superior risk management.  
This study addressed four research questions: (i) How should risk be allocated in PPPs? (ii) How 
should risk be valued? (iii) Do PPPs create VfM? (iv) Is risk essential for value creation? 
With respect to the first question, we find that risk is crucial for VfM. Although the three main parties 
in a PPP (the government, the company, and the bank as lender) possess their own objectives, the 
three parties must be aligned concerning the allocation of risk. Academic researchers express 
concern for risk allocation, and some consider that VfM is used to make PPPs appear more 
advantageous. However, governments focus on providing guidelines to public departments 
concerning risk allocation. 
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With respect to the second question, we document that the public sector usually adopts simple 
valuation tools that are often based on a qualitative approach. Contrastingly, academics usually 
employ methodologies such as VaR, NPV-at-risk, CFaR, and real options. NPV-at-risk and CFaR are 
appropriate to apply in a PPP context. However, the academic literature on this issue is limited only 
in terms of quantity and because existing studies use only one technique or consider a single project.  
To answer the third and fourth questions, we examined PPP evaluation by academics, governments, 
and audit courts. We examined the paper, government report, and audit report conclusions in terms 
of VfM generation and risk management. All parties provide a positive answer to the fourth question; 
however, they report diverging conclusions for the third. Academics are sceptical concerning PPP 
ability for VfM generation, whereas governments are not. Academic scepticism (related to risk 
transfer) is based on the following. First, the PSC favours PPPs because PPPs only generate VfM 
following risk transfer. The private sector bears limited risk and risk valuation is an ambiguous 
concept. The public sector claims that PPPs create VfM because they are more efficient than the 
alternative public procurement and because PPPs reduce uncertainty. 
All the studies we reviewed, however, have several limitations. First, PPPs are a convoluted system 
involving different parts and specific technicalities. Additionally, PPPs worldwide are either 
incomplete or have not yet reached maturity. Second, studies are based on a single PPP or country. 
This is an important issue because the PPP experience differs substantially according to country. 
Finally, studies lack objectivity and data. 
Are the results we found contradictory? Somehow yes, but limitations, different methodologies, and 
a lack of meta-analysis causes conclusions that are vague and imprecise. Therefore, additional 
country studies with complete methodologies, risk evaluation tools, a greater number of projects, 
richer data, and longer study periods are required. Further research can clarify PPP ability to 






1. Among others: HM Treasury (1998), Linder (1999), Osborne (2000), Savas (2000), Klijn (2000), 
European Commission (2003), Akintoye, Beck, and Hardcastle (2003), Bovaird (2004), Corner 
(2006), OECD (2008), Hodge and Greve (2009).  
2. According to Kwak, YingYi, and Ibbs (2009), no risk is applicable to all PPP projects and there is 
no consensus on a universal risk classification approach. The authors provide a comprehensive 
list of investment project risks. A similar list is found in Tinsley (2001) and a lengthy, descriptive 
list of risk is found in Akintoye (2001).  
3. See Savvides (1994), Raymar (1997), and Moreno and Navas (2003) for a technical note on the 
use of this tool and Javid and Seneviratne (2000) and Gatti et al. (2007) for the use of Monte-
Carlo simulation in PPP risk. For government use of Monte-Carlo simulation see HM Treasury 
(2003c).  
4. This is developed in Roll and Ross (1980).  
5. However, Andersen’s (2000) study, which is frequently cited in defence of PPPs, has pitfalls. First, 
Andersen only analyses 7% of the total number of projects (28 out of 400). Second, risk accounts 
for 60% of total savings. Third, 80% of the savings account for a single project that was run by a 
company with close ties to Andersen at the time. Therefore, this study should not be relied 
upon. According to Shaoul (2009), studies by the global consulting firms Price Waterhouse 
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Table 1 – Allocation of different types of risk 
This table summarises the literature on how risks are allocated. Planning risks: risks related with the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the project; Environmental risks: risks related to environmental 
regulations and approvals; Demand risks: risks related with insufficient demand, which is necessary to profitability; 
Finance risks: risks related with the financing of the CAPEX and which mainly changes with the interest rate. 
Type of Risks 
Literature  favouring risk 
allocation to the  
Public Sector 
Literature  favouring shared 
risk allocation 
Literature favouring risk 
allocation to the Private 
Sector 
Planning (Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, & Hardcastle, 2005b)  
 
(Ng & Loosemore, 2007) 
 




(Lewis, 2001)  
 
(Bing et al., 2005b) 
(Ng & Loosemore, 2007) 




(Wang, Tiong, Ting, & 
Ashley, 2000) 
(Lewis, 2001)  
(Bing et al., 2005b)  
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005b) 
(Ng & Loosemore, 2007) 
(Chung et al., 2010)  
Finance ----------------------- 
(Wang et al., 2000)  
(Lewis, 2001)  
(Ng & Loosemore, 2007)  
(Bing et al., 2005b)  
(Chung et al., 2010)  
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005b) 
 




Table 2 – Risk allocation in governmental reports 
This table presents the main guidelines that governments (of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom) use to allocate risks in PPP. 
PSC and VfM stand for public sector comparator and Value for Money, respectively. 
 
Report Country Year Main guidelines 
(Scotia, 1997) Transferring Risks in 
PPP Canada 
1997 • Risk is divided in four categories: Ownership; Operational; Financial and “Acts of God” 
• Guidelines about strategies to allocate risks (must be objective and clearly evaluated)  
(NAO) - Examining the value for 
money of deals under the Private 
Finance Initiative 
UK 2000 
•  Description of several risk categories and to whom they should be allocated  
•  Each project has its own specification 
(Treasury) The Government´s 
Approach  UK 
2000 • Clear differentiation between private sector responsibilities and remaining public sector accountability  
• Contractor is only exposed to financial penalties for his own performance 
(Victoria) Partnerships Victoria: 
Guidance material Overview Australia 
2001 
• Private party should bear risks related to designing, building, and operating the infrastructure, including the risk of 
obsolescence and/or residual value  
• VfM: government should retain the risks which they can manage efficiently  
• Specific government-preferred approaches for each type of risk (10 major categories) 
• How to price risks 
(Canada) Public-Private 
Partnerships: A Canadian Guide Canada 
2001 
• Potential risks associated with PPPs  
• Governments can reduce or eliminate these risks through negotiations and contractual arrangements  
• The costs that these risks represent must be factored into the PSC model  
• It is important to consider the financial strength of the parties to whom risks are allocated  
(Victoria) Partnerships Victoria: PSC 
Supplementary Technical Note Australia 
2003 • Risk allocation guide  
• PSC includes a valuation of transferable and retained risks  
(Canada) The Public Sector 
Comparator: A Canadian Best 
Practices Guide  
Canada 2003 
• PSC is a risk-adjusted costing 
•  Each type of risk should be aggregated to determine the NPV of the transferable risk component of the PSC  
• Each type of risk should be included as a separate cash flow item, for a detailed analysis and their sensitivity  
(Canada)  P3 Public Sector Readiness 
Assessment Guide Canada 
2003 
• Public sector must develop a contingency plans for mitigating risk  
• All risks should be identified in an appropriate matrix  
• Optimum allocation should be identified 
(Treasury) PFI – Meeting the 
Investment Challenge UK 
2003 • Transfer only those risks which the private sector can more effectively and efficiently manage 
 
(Treasury) The Orange Book UK 2004 
• Aims at an optimum response to risk  
• Prioritizes risks based on an evaluation  




Report Country Year Main guidelines 
(Treasury) and (Treasury) 




• Standard mandatory spread sheet for the VfM assessment, with a proposed testable risk management approach 
• Identifies all relevant risks, irrespective of which party has responsibility for managing the risk  
• Identifies which party is best placed to manage each risk 
(Treasury) PFI: strengthening long-
term partnerships UK 
2006 • Setting out further improvements to PPP to support their ongoing important role in delivering better public services 
• Defines risks to be transferred to private and to be retained by public sector 
(Treasury)  VfM Assessment Guide UK 2006 
• Optimum allocation of risks is one of the main key drivers for VfM 
• The transfer or risks goal is to incentive private sector efficiency and VfM 
(Treasury) How to manage the 
delivery of long-term PFI contracts 
New 
Zealand 
2007 • Contingent plans for the public sector in case of reassuming risks previously allocated to the private sector 
(Treasury) Standardization of PFI 
Contracts Version 4 UK 
2007 • Promotes a common understanding of the main risks encountered in a standard PPP project 
 (4P`s, 2007) A  guide to contract 
management for PFI and PPP 
projects 
UK 2007 
• Risks and levels of deductions must be clearly understood by all parties  
• Systems and methodologies should be in place to mitigate operational risks  
• Risks should be reviewed at all stages of the process  
(Treasury) Guidance for Public 




• Government has to evaluate benefits, risks, and costs of the preferred option against other options  
• PSC includes an estimation for any additional costs and for risks that would be transferred to the private sector partner 
under a PPP 
• Risk allocation matrix must be developed, all risks should be considered, and no unintended effects should arise 
(4P´s, 2009) 
4P´s: developing public private 
partnerships in housing 
UK 2009 • Summary analysis of risks and benefits of PPP, particularly in the housing sector programme  




Table 3 - Risk models valuation  
 
This table presents the risk valuation models used in PPP in the literature. DEA: Data envelopment analysis; DCF: Discounted cash-flows; WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. 
 
MODEL AUTHORS CHARACTHERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Value at Risk 
(Gatti et al., 2007) 
(Li, 2008) 
(Hanli, ChaoQun, 
Bo, & Tao, 2009) 
Specific VaR (with Monte-Carlo 
simulation) for project finance 
specifications 
• Calculates the default risk 
of a PPP project 
• Recognises different levels 
of complexity of project 
• More precise in risk-
adjusted pricing 
• Quantity and quality data 
required 
• Need to checking the 
model structure and the key 
indicators 
• Difficult to precisely 
estimate the distribution of 
parameters in the model 
precisely 
• Suited for estimating project 
risks for sponsors and lenders 
• Method that simplify PPP 
complexity 
•  
NPV at Risk 
(Sudong & Tiong, 
2000) 
 
(Ye S D, 2000) 
Combines WACC with dual risk 
methods 
• Leads to a better decision 
in risk valuation than 
traditional methods like CAPM 
•  
• Complex 
• Quantity and quality data 
required 
  
• NPV at risk represents a more 
vigorous investment decision 
method 
• . 
Cash-Flow at Risk 
(Youngen, Guth, 
Tennican e Usher, 
(2001)) 
Simulates cash-flow risk by 
Monte-Carlo simulation 
• More appropriate for 
projects than VaR 
• Requires calculating a 
probability distribution for 
future cash-flows 
• Quantifies differences in the 




(Cheng, Chiang, & 
Tang, 2007) 
calculate the credit scoring 
model of a PPP by DEA 
• DEA is more objective 
• Used in several types of 
financial loans, not just PPP 
• Only applies to credit 
scoring. 
• Valid only for financial risk 
• Appropriate because PPP relies 
strongly on debt financed by banks 
Real Options 




(Takashima et al., 
2010) 
Subsidies and guarantees 
represent a form of options 
and all options have value 
Real options provide a 
framework for valuating these 
guarantees  
 
• Flexibility of this approach 
• More accurate valuation of 
guarantees and risks in a PPP 
• Use of DCF with a single 
risk-adjusted discount rate is 
problematic 
• No multiple PPP cases in a 
single study 
• Complexity of the analysis.  
• Options can be evaluated with 








Table 4 - Valuation risk models used by governments 




DOCUMENT CHARACTHERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
CAPM using  
DCF analysis Australia (Victoria, 2003b) 
Risk is considered in the 
discount rate Simple risk valuation 
Discount rate must be 
calculated for each 
project 
Depends on the accuracy of forecast 






UK (Treasury, 2003a) 
Adds a risk premium to 
provide the value of base case, 
in order to adjust for the 
“optimist bias”.  
More complex and 
detailed analysis than 
other governments 
guidelines 
Requires more data and 
more specialized staff  
Add a risk premium to provide the 
full expected value of the base case 




Australia (Victoria, 2003a) Uses probability distribution of input variables Risk allocation guide. 
Only possible if 
sufficient data are 
available 
Technique depends on significance 






Korea (ADB, 2011) 
Examines the level of returns 
to private parties in 
comparison with the risks that 
they bear 
 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
is a private sector put option 
on toll revenue, and early 




right is a call option on toll 
revenue and early termination 
is a call option on the project 
Valuate risks for all PPP 
participants  
 
More complex and 







Estimation of appropriate return 
has steps:  
(i) estimation 
of base case fair return and  
(ii) adjustment for option values 
such as minimum revenue 
guarantee or redemption right of 
government. 
Source: own table 
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Table 5 - Academic studies on Value for Money and Risk in PPPs 
This table summarizes the academic findings regarding VfM and Risk in PPP projects. Column “VfM” indicates whether the PPP yields VfM: Y indicates that VfM is positive; N 
indicates that VfM is negative; N/D indicates that it could not be determined whether VfM is positive. The column ’Risk crucial to VfM?’” shows whether risk as an indispensable 
issue for ensuring VfM in PPPs (Y=yes, N=no). CSF = Critical success factors; PSC= Public sector comparator; VfM= Value for Money.   
 
AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM RISK CRUCIAL TO VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(Ball) 2000 UK High School projects N Y 
• VfM remains uncertain 
• Risk valuation has uncertainties, making risk transfer unreliable 
• Risk transfer may not be as significant as the public sector claims 
(Froud & Shaoul) 2001 UK NHS Hospitals N Y 
• Risk transfer is main justification for PPP and is central to VfM 
• Interest rate paid by private sector suggests that banks consider PPPs low risk 
• Limited evidence on risk transfer 
(McCabe) 2001 UK Schools N Y 
• Concerns about quantification of risk transfer and cost calculation, which questions 
validation of PSC and VfM 
• Doubts over selectivity in transferred risks, methods used to calculate risk-related costs, 
and the fact that the public sector assumes all demand risks 
• Confirms questions raised by previous studies over robustness and subjective nature of 
evidence used to substantiate VfM in PPPs 
(Pollock) 2002 UK 6 Hospitals N Y 
• VfM assessment is skewed in favour of private sector 
• VfM is only shown after risk transfer 
• NPV of PSC is lower than PPP before risk transfer 
• No method for valuating risks 
(Pollitt) 2002 UK 10 PPP projects Y Y 
• PPP is successful in the UK, compared with traditional procurement 
• PPPs save time and money, promote innovation and efficiently allocate risks 
(Shaoul) 2002 UK PPP London Underground N Y 
• Project was not affordable, since private sector does not assume risks, relying on public 
guarantees 
(English) 2003 Australia Overall projects N Y 
• Evidence that governments are not as successful as private-sector in identifying and shifting 
risk and, therefore, at achieving VfM 
(Edwards) 2004 UK 8 Roads and 13 hospitals N/D Y 
• Allocation of risk among partners may be unclear and therefore so is its transfer Additional 




AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM RISK CRUCIAL TO VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(Fitzgerald) 2004 Australia 8 projects N/D Y 
• Risk evaluation process needs to be improved 
• Need more evidence of frequency and a large sample of risks events 
• Public sector should use a discount rate that does not incorporate a premium risk 
(Hodge) 2004 Australia Roads infrastructure N/D Y 
• Investigates risk transfer 
• Outlines empirical experience on transfer of risks 
(Bing et al.) 2005 UK Construction projects N/D Y 
• Examines, through a questionnaire, the importance of 18 CSFs for PPP 
• Finds risk allocation and sharing are relevant CSFs 
(Hodge) 
 2005 Australia Overall projects N/D Y 
• Few available assessments suggest varied performance 
• No rigorous and transparent evaluations of all Australian PPPs 
(Pollitt) 2005 UK Overall projects Y Y • Positive overall assessment 
(Shaoul) 2005 UK Health sector N Y 
• Risk transfer is an ambiguous concept 
• Uses ex-ante risk transfer to close gap between public and private options, to ensure 
preference is given to PPP 
• Instead of demonstrating risk transfer, business case simply asserts what they intended to 
prove 





• Up to 24% of PPPs have ‘optimism bias’ in risk adjustment 
• Studies fail to present sound data-based proof for addressing time and costs overruns 
(Dixon) 2005 UK Case-studies N/D Y 
• VfM and risk transfer are key to success 
• High procurement and transaction costs, and large-scale nature of PPPs are barriers to 
entry 
(Boardman) 2005 USA Private toll road case N Y 
• PPPs incur significant losses, even after refinancing and tax benefits 
(Shaoul, Stafford, 
& Stapleton) 2006 UK 8 Highway projects N Y 
• Risk transfer is critical to PPP VfM 
• Most risk transfers are related to construction risks. But after construction phase, it is not 
clear what other risks, beside operational ones, the private sector accounts for 
• Risk transfer is very expensive 
(Blanc-Brude) 2006 Europe 65 PPP across 15 EU countries N/D Y 
 
• Ex-ante construction costs of PPPs are 24% higher than traditional procurement 
• Whether PPPs have lower overall life-cycle costs remains unknown 
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AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM RISK CRUCIAL TO VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(Darvish) 2006 Australia 2 PPP: Tunnel and Airport N Y 
• VfM and private sector profits in PPPs are only viable through optimal risk allocation and 
balance of interests between public and private sectors 
(English) 2007 Australia Overall projects N Y 
• Australia’s audit offices largely fail to independently scrutinise PPP 
• High premium in transferring risks to private sector 
(Pollock, Price, & 
Player) 2007 UK 11 PPP projects N Y 
• No evidence of improved efficiency in PPP 
• The Treasury “Green book” is biased towards PPPs 
(Ng & 
Loosemore) 2007 Australia Railway project N Y 
• Government assumes most of the risks. 
• Provides useful recommendations for better risk management 
• Shows complexity and obscurity of risks in PPPs and difficulties in distributing such risks 
appropriately 
(Chung) 2007 Australia Hospital project N Y 
• Government fails to ensure that financing is channelled through appropriate risk sharing 
arrangements. It fails to make private sector accountable for required level of quality 
(Ball) 2007 UK School projects N Y 
• Suggests a significant problem with VfM in PPP projects 
• VfM and economic viability of projects depend entirely on transfer of risk in 9 of 11 projects 
• Highlights problems with risk transfer 
• 2/3 of risk transfer regards construction and quality. Inaccurate risk transfer lead to 
different results in VfM 
• Without risk transfer, 5 projects would have had a lower VfM by more than 10% 
(Nisar) 2007 UK 
5 cases: Prison, 
hospital, bridge and 
military 
N Y 
• Evidence is balanced on PPP effectiveness 
• More emphasis needs to be placed on strategies for transfer of risk for successful 
conclusion of PPP contracts 
(Chan) 2008 Australia Bridge project N Y 
• Improper allocation of risks could affect success of PPP 
• Project failed due to fact that Government managed to pass on many of the project risks to 
private sector 
(Barlow & 
Köberle-Gaiser) 2008 UK 6 hospitals N Y 
• PPPs increase complexity between project delivery and hospital operational functions 
• Inefficient allocation of risks hinders innovation 




AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY Type of PPP  VfM RISK CRUCIAL TO VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(Broadbent et al.) ´2008 UK 17 Health PPPs N Y 
• Risk estimation is central in decision making 
• Dominance in “accounting logic” 
• Quantitative analysis and recognising uncertainty are important 
(Andrew) 2009 Australia Prisons N Y • Cost data are not an adequate basis for policy decisions 
(Tallman) 2010 Canada Overall projects N Y 
• In over half of the cases, risks are identified through formal mechanisms, but few quantify 
risks 
• Less than half of the cases show VfM generation. Half of the cases do not evaluate VfM. 
(Cuthbert & 
Cuthbert) 2010 UK Health project N Y 
• NPV of PSC is inflated because of misallocation ascribing of risks and costs. 
• Decision was biased in PPP favour 
(Demirag & 
Khadaroo) 2010 UK School projects Y Y 
• Evaluates VfM Ex-post and impact of project size in VfM 





2010 UK and Scotland 
Overall projects 
with 6 case-studies N/D Y 
• Risks transferred from public sector are dispersed amongst multiple entities. This 
dispersion of risks adds cost, raising questions about VfM 
(Sarmento) 2010 Portugal PPP roads N Y 
• PSC considerably below PPP payments 
• PPPs only show VfM if public sector has high levels of inefficiency 
(Ball) 2011 Australia and UK Overall projects ND Y 
• In the UK there are doubts about the validity of the VfM analysis, even the NAO ones. 
• In Australia some analysis conclude that some projects did not show VfM 




2012 Australia Overall projects Y Y • PPPs show VfM especially in large and complex projects, due to risk transfer 
(Haughton & 
Mcmanus) 2012 Australia Tunnel project N Y 




2013 Europe Health N/D Y 
• Results are mixed: older PPPs did not show effectiveness, as new models show better 
opportunities for gains, but are harder to set up and manage 




Table 6 - Main criticism on VfM in PPP 
 
This table summarizes the main criticisms in the literature regarding VfM in PPPs.  
PSC: Public sector comparator; VfM: Value for Money  
 
Main Points Main ideas Authors 
Private sector 
risks 
• Private sector assumes few risks and therefore has 
little incentive to perform better and be more efficient 
 (Ball, 2000);(Froud & Shaoul, 2001); 
(Shaoul, 2002); (Shaoul et al., 2006); (Ng 
& Loosemore, 2007) 
Risk concepts 
• Risk is an ambiguous concept 
• Risk is complex 
• Risk valuation is uncertain 
(Ball, 2000); (Shaoul, 2005); (Ng & 
Loosemore, 2007); (Broadbent et al., 
2008) 
Risk valuation • No methods or simple methods used  (McCabe, 2001); (Pollock, 2002); (Fitzgerald, 2004); (Tallman, 2010) 
PSC  
• PSC is biased in favour of PPP  
• Optimist bias 
• Discount rate used in PSC favours PPPs 
 (Pollock, 2002);(Pollock, 2005);(Pollock 
et al., 2007);(Shaoul, 2005); (Sarmento, 
2010)  
Risks and VfM 
• Risk transfer is used to close the gap between PSC 
and PPP  
• PPP only show VfM after risk transfer 
(Froud & Shaoul, 2001); (Pollock, 2002); 
(Shaoul, 2005); (Ball, 2007) 





Table 7 - Public sector reports on Value of Money and Risk in PPPs  
 
Panel A summarizes government reports on PPP whereas Panel B shows Courts of Audit reports. Both panels evaluate PPPs’ VfM and the role of risk in achieving VfM. Column VfM 
indicates whether Value for Money is obtained (Y=yes,N= No;N/D=unable to determine VfM. Column “Risk crucial to VfM?” shows if the study considers risk as an indispensable issue 
for ensuring VfM in PPPs. CSF= Critical success factors; PSC= Public sector comparator; VfM= Value for Money   
PANEL A – GOVERNMENT REPORTS 
AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY PPP  ANALYZED VfM 
RISK CRUCIAL TO 
VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(Andersen) 2000 UK 29 projects Y Y 
• Risk is the main driver (out of 6) of VfM 
• Cost savings amount to  17% relative to traditional procurement, but most of 
these savings are explained by 2 very successful PPPs 
(Macdonald) 2002 UK 11 PPP vs 39 public projects Y Y 
• PPPs deliver late in 24% of cases and overestimated cost in 22% 
• Public projects deliver late in 70% of cases and overestimated cost in 73% 
(Commission) 2003 UK Schools Y Y • Economic viability and VfM in all PPP schools depend on risk transfer 
((VPAEC)) 2006 Australia Overall projects N/D Y 
•  Limited independent external scrutiny of PPP to date 
•  Inadequate independent oversight (in quality and quantity); Inconclusive on 
PPPs ability to transfer risk, achieve VfM and savings, and other program 
objectives 
(Group) 2007 Australia 21 PPP projects vs 33 public Y Y 
•  PPPs clearly demonstrate greater cost efficiency than traditional 
procurement 
•  Traditional procurement does not eliminate risks, only transfers them to 
taxpayers 
(Forum) 2008 Australia 




•  In 35% of the cases, PPPs perform better than traditional procurement 
•  PPPs have average cost escalation of 4.3%, compared to 18% for traditional 
projects 
•  During construction, average delay for PPPs is 2.6%, and for traditional 
procurement 25.9% 





PANEL B – COURTs OF AUDIT REPORTS 
 
AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY PPP ANALYZED VfM RISK CRUCIAL TO VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(NAO) 2003 UK 38 PPPs vs 37 public projects  Y Y 
• PPP deliver on time in 76% of cases and within budget in 78%  
• Public projects deliver on time in only 30% of cases and within budget in only 
27%  
(NAO) 2004 UK London underground N/D Y 
•  Inconclusive on performance assessment against contractual benchmarks 
•  Public sector needs to follow best practices in risk management 
(NAO) 2004 UK London underground N/D Y 
•  Limited assurance that risk valuation is credible 
•  High rate of return for the risks assumed 
(NAO) 2006 UK Paddington Hospital N Y 
• Large number and scale of risks is one of three main reasons for project’s 
failure 
• Significant risks, due to complexity and timescale (that lead to specific 
additional project and political risks) 
(AUDIT) 2006 Australia Schools Y Y 
• VfM is achieved with risk transfer 
• Savings between PPP and PSC are due to valuation of risk transfer to private 
sector 
(AUDIT) 2006 Australia Tunnel project N/D Y •  Inconclusive on whether PPP generates VfM 
(Auditor-
General) 2007 Australia 
2 major PPP 
projects Y Y 
•  Risk allocation is reasonable 
•  Projects are well managed and effective  
(NAO) 2009 UK Defence PPP projects Y Y 
• Effective risk allocation and management is particularly important to 
delivering VfM in PPP contracts 
• Most risks are well managed 
• In nine out of ten examined risk categories, there was either low or moderate 
risk in private sector 




AUTHOR YEAR COUNTRY PPP ANALYZED VfM RISK CRUCIAL TO VfM? 
CONCLUSIONS 
(NAO) 2009 UK Overall PPP Y Y 
• PPPs usually deliver what was contracted. They also successfully transfer risks 
• Risk transfer depends on contracts 
• Few PPPs fail  
(NAO) 2009 UK Construction performance Y Y 
• PPPs were delivered on time and within budget in two thirds of the time 
• Public projects were delivered on time in two thirds of the cases and within 
budget in half of the cases 
(NAO) 2009 UK Schools N/D Y 
•  Inconclusive regarding VfM  
•  Achieving VfM requires cost savings in long-run 
(NAO) 2009 UK Municipal waste  N/D Y •  VfM depend if PPP meet the expected targets  
(NAO) 2010 UK Overall PPP: 162 projects N Y 
• No clear data to conclude whether PPPs have led to demonstrably better or 
worse VfM than other forms of procurement 
• Insufficient data on returns to equity investors for the risks they  bear 
• Due to financial crisis, PPPs may no longer be as efficient as they were in the 
past 
(NAO) 2010 UK Housing sector N/D Y 
• Housing is one of the more complex PPP sectors due to the specific risks 
(construction and tenants) 
• More comparative assessment of VfM and risks is necessary 
(NAO) 2010 UK Hospital Y Y 
• Most contracts perform satisfactorily or better than expected 
• Inconclusive about whether PPPs generate VfM better by including hotel 
services in contracts 
(Auditor-
General) 2010 Australia Prisons N Y 
• Appropriate management of the allocated risks is necessary to avoid 
deterioration in the VfM 
(NAO) 2012 UK Equity capital in PPP N/D Y 
• Private investors bear some but very limited risks. 
• Public sector has relied on competition to seek efficient contract pricing, 
without information about the PSC cost 
• Concern that public sector is paying more than it should for equity 
investment 
Source: own table 
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Table 8 –PPPs in government’s reports 
 
This table summarizes the main arguments for and against PPPs, according to the government and courts of audit reports 
included in Table 5 and 7. 
VfM: Value for Money 
 
Arguments in favour Arguments against 
PPPs reduce cost  and time deviations  
VfM depends entirely on risk transfer 
Yet, risk transfer is subjective and difficult to 
measure 
PPPs deliver what was contracted Low/inadequate risk transfer 
Few PPPs fail and most perform well Public sector could be paying more than it should 
With time and experience, PPPs become more 
efficient, and private sector returns decrease (in 
early PPPs, the private sector gained excessive 
returns)  
Not all projects should be conducted as a PPP 
Traditional procurement does not eliminate 
risks, but only transfer them to taxpayers Evaluations are not independent enough 
 More and better studies and evaluations are required 
 Insufficient data 




Table 9 - Value for Money in PPPs 
 
This table presents the results on VfM from academic studies, government reports and Courts of Audit reports. Information 
is presented by the number of studies/reports by evaluation outcome (Y – show VfM; N – Not show VfM, N/D- VfM not 




Country Nº Studies 
VfM? 
YES NO N/D  














Canada 1 (2.5%) 0 
1 
(2.5%) 0 
Europe 2 (5%) 0 0 
2 
(5%) 
Portugal 1 (2.5%) 0 
1 
(2.5%) 0 
USA 1 (2.5%) 0 
1 
(2.5%) 0 






Country Nº Studies VfM? YES NO N/D  
UK 4 (40%) 
4 
(40%) 0 0 





TOTAL 7 6 (86%) 0 
1 
(14%) 
Courts of Audit reports 
Country Nº Studies VfM? YES NO N/D – N/A 























Table 10 –The UK and Australian PPP experience 
This table shows an overview of PPP studies by country and type of projects and highlights the studies which demonstrate that VfM was generated and those which cannot.  The table 
limits to studies to those on the UK and Australia. BC: Business Case; NAO: National Audit Office (UK); PSC: Public Sector Comparator. 
Panel A: Comparable studies on VfM by country and type of project 








Prisons (Auditor-General, 2010) (Andrew, 2009) 
Railway -------------- (Ng & Loosemore, 2007) 
Schools (AUDIT, 2006b) ------------------ 
Health ------------- (Chung, 2007) 
Individual projects 






















Health (NAO, 2010b) 
(Froud & Shaoul, 2001) 
(Pollock, 2002) 
(NAO, 2006) 
(Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) 
(Cuthbert & Cuthbert, 2010) 
Roads -------------- (Shaoul et al., 2006) 





(Pollock et al., 2007) 
(Nisar, 2007) 




Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B : Comparable studies on VfM by country and type of methodology 
COUNTRY PPP PROJECT 
STUDY SHOW VfM STUDY NOT SHOW VfM 
AUTHOR METHODOLOGY AUTHOR METHODOLOGY 
AUSTRALIA Overall projects 
(Group, 2007) • Compares costs and times between 
traditional procurement and PPPs 
(English, 2003) 
• Based on PPPs’ performance audits 




• Calculates the cost of the PSC (with risk 
adjustment) and compares it with the 
PPP cost 
(NAO, 2010a) • Compares the conclusions of five 
previous NAO reports 
(Macdonald, 2002) • Compares real costs and time 
execution with the base case 
(Pollitt, 2002) • Case-studies and overall NAO 
assessment 
(NAO, 2003) 
• Compares the PPPs cost with 
traditional procurement cost 
• Assumes the latter to have a certain 
price, be completed on time, and have 
the same quality output 
(Pollitt, 2005) • Case studies 
(NAO, 2009e) • Based on conclusions of previous 
reports of NAO 
(NAO, 2009d) • Survey: Do PPPs achieve contracted price, time, and quality? 
Schools 
(Commission, 2003) • Compares PSC with PPPs (Ball, 2000) • Survey on risk impact 
(CCPPP, 2010) • A survey on opinion of several stakeholders (McCabe, 2001) • Case-study 
(Demirag et al., 2010) • Survey  (Ball, 2007) • Analysis of VfM without risk transfer  
Health (NAO, 2010b) 
• Compares real costs /specifications 
with contract; 





(Barlow & Köberle-Gaiser, 2008) 
• Compare PSC with PPPs 
 
• Interviews and case studies 
(Cuthbert & Cuthbert, 2010) • Case-study 
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